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Introduction 
 
On June 6 Iran was presented with a revised package of incentives to persuade it to curb its 
uranium enrichment programme. The package was finalised in Vienna on June 2 by the 
permanent five members of the UN Security Council (United States, Britain, France, Russia and 
China), plus Germany – hereafter referred to as the P5+1. 
 
Details of the proposals have not been made public, but an early draft was leaked to ABC News 
(see Appendix). This Note is a preliminary analysis of this draft P5+1 proposal. It will be updated 
once the final offer is made public. 
 
This latest offer is a definite improvement on the E3 /EU offer made in August 2005, in that it is 
less demanding and gives clearer incentives. The fact that it appears to have the backing of the 
United States, Russia and China provides much needed additional authority and credibility. The 
softening of the US position in particular demonstrates recognition of the importance of the 
multilateral approach. 
 
We argued previously that the earlier E3/EU proposal was vague on incentives and heavy on 
demands. (See BASIC Note 11 August 2005 http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN050811-
IranEU.htm). If this proposal today had been offered a year ago (or better still two years ago) we 
could have probably avoided much of the damage to diplomatic relations between Iran and the 
West, and generated a greater degree of cooperation in resolving the mistrust and fear on both 
sides. 
 
What’s new and to be welcomed? 
 
There are several new aspects in the leaked proposal that provide grounds for optimism, 
including:  
1. The willingness of the United States to sit down directly with Iran, conditional upon a 
suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities during the negotiations. 
2. Recognition of the Isfahan uranium conversion plant. 
3. The establishment of an international fuel cycle centre in Russia, with Iran as a partner, 
to enrich UF6 from Isfahan (though it is ambiguous as to the involvement of Iranian 
scientists). 
4. Establishment of a five-year fuel-bank/buffer stock exclusively for the use by Iran 
(though its location is ambiguous). 
5. A clear reaffirmation of Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
   
6. An energy partnership to deepen Iran’s energy security, investment in its oil and gas 
infrastructure, and assistance in energy conservation and renewable technologies. 
7. A new political forum to involve Iran and other regional states, the United States, Russia 
and China, with a view to establishing confidence building mechanisms, including 
recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and crucial security guarantees for Iran. 
8. Talks on the establishment of a WMD-free zone for the Middle East, holding the promise 
of pulling Israel in to the discussions. 
 
Other media reports citing unnamed European officials suggest that an even more significant 
concession may have been made: Iran could be allowed to retain some uranium enrichment 
activities under tight IAEA safeguards provided it reaches agreement with the P5+1. 
 
Remaining problems 
 
First, the demand that Iran suspend its enrichment activities before talks can begin will 
undoubtedly provide a point of friction over the next few weeks. The Iranians will see it as giving 
up leverage with no clear quid pro quo commitment on the part of the US or the Europeans. 
However, if this is seen as a temporary cessation rather than a moratorium then the prospects 
of at least getting to the negotiating table look brighter. 
 
Second, even though the proposal demands that Iran suspend its nuclear fuel cycle, it holds out 
the possibility of the transfer of Western nuclear technology to Iran, including significant 
assistance in constructing new light water reactors. But this fails to address the fundamental 
underlying problem that a fully domestic nuclear power involves processes that are inherently 
dual-use in nature, and that the linkage with a nuclear weapon capability, while manageable to 
some extent under strict safeguards, is at heart unbreakable. This offer goes beyond recognition 
of Iran’s rights to nuclear power, by positively encouraging and assisting in its development. 
This is like offering a teenager methadone out of the fear they may try heroine in a few years’ 
time.  
 
A better alternative would be to focus efforts on fleshing out the proposed energy partnership 
with real commitments for valuable investment and significant technology transfer, with the 
objective of building a vibrant world-leading sustainable energy industry in Iran weighted 
towards renewables. Iran has significant natural resources that lend themselves to wind, solar 
and hydroelectric power with potential energy outputs that dwarf any plans for nuclear energy.  
 
Fundamentally, the problem lies in international double standards in the nuclear field: states 
making demands of Iran at a point when they themselves are on the brink of a massive 
expansion in their own nuclear power industries, and a renewal of nuclear weapons in the 
nuclear weapon states. In demanding Iran demonstrate that “any new activity in the nuclear field 
is linked to a credible and coherent economic rationale”, the P5+1 should show the lead and do 
the same. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It would be a mistake for the Iranian leadership to believe that these concessions from the West 
are the result of a hard line negotiating stance or because the strategic balance has shifted in 
their favour; and that by holding the line further concessions can be extracted. That would be a 
highly dangerous course of action, especially since it appears that Russia and China have 
agreed in principle to consider targeted sanctions and other economic sticks in the event of an 
agreement not being reached. The employment of economic sanctions that may not be effective 
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against those targeted within Iran could build an unstoppable momentum and presage moves 
towards US military action.  
 
It would also be a mistake for Iran to focus entirely upon its rights under the NPT, to the 
exclusion of its responsibilities, both to its own people and in addressing the concerns of the 
international community. Iran does have a right to develop its nuclear power industry, but it 
needs to build confidence with the international community, and to consider whether its nuclear 
power plans really do represent value for money in comparison with other options open to them. 
To continue with the nuclear option simply for reasons of misguided prestige would be a false 
diplomatic victory: Iran would have surrendered its energy security to misplaced ideological and 
political ends. 
 
The multilateral approach demonstrated by this proposal is to be welcomed. It is crucial, 
however, that this is not abused (by either side) to create the conditions for an escalation in the 
crisis. Negotiations must be given a proper chance, which will demand further flexibility on the 
part of the United States and Iran in the interests of an agreement. The negotiations might take 
months, even years, but a ‘grand bargain’ that satisfies both sides is possible. 
 
The key micro issue in any such bargain will involve enrichment. Tehran may need to accept 
limitations on its enrichment capabilities (i.e. no indigenous industrial-scale enrichment), with the 
fuel for its reactors being produced abroad and shipped back when spent. The United States 
may need to allow Iran to maintain its 164-centrifuge enrichment cascade at Natanz for 
research purposes, under additional supervision. At the macro-level security guarantees will be 
central to any deal. The current nuclear dispute is not the cause, but a symptom, of a failed 
relationship between Tehran and Washington. It is this relationship that must, in the long-term, 
be improved if further political crises like the present one are to be avoided. 
 
Appendix 
 
Draft Proposals as leaked to ABC News: 
 
POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF A REVISED PROPOSAL TO IRAN 
 
To develop relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of 
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and to 
prepare for a fresh start in negotiations of a comprehensive agreement to that end, to be 
deposited with the IAEA and endorsed in a Security Council resolution: 
 
The International Community will: 
 
- reaffirm Iran's inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in line with Art 
IV of the NPT and in conformity with its international obligations, and political support 
for development of a civil nuclear programme; 
- actively support activities in accordance with Iran's civil nuclear plan, including the 
building of new light water reactors in Iran through joint projects, within the framework 
of the IAEA and in accordance with its Statute; 
- agree to suspend discussions of Iran's file at the Security Council on resumption of 
negotiations. 
 
Iran will: 
 3 
   
 
- commit to address the outstanding issues and all other international concerns through full 
cooperation with the IAEA; 
- suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and commit to continue this 
during these negotiations; 
- resume implementation of the Additional Protocol. 
 
AREAS OF FUTURE COOPERATION TO BE COVERED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON A 
LONG TERM AGREEMENT 
 
NUCLEAR 
 
International community will take the following steps: 
 
Iran's right to nuclear energy: 
 
- reaffirm Iran's inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in line with Art 
IV of the NPT and in conformity with its international obligations, and reaffirm its 
political support for development of a civil nuclear programme; 
- negotiate and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear cooperation agreement. 
 
Light Water Reactors: 
 
- in accordance with Iran's own civil nuclear power generation plan, actively support the 
building of new light water reactors in Iran through joint projects, within the framework of the 
IAEA and in accordance with its Statute, using state-of-the art technology, including authorising 
the transfer of necessary goods. 
 
ECONOMIC 
 
International Trade & Investment 
 
Support for full integration into international structures, including the WTO, and to create the 
framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran (including a Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement with EU). 
 
Civil Aviation 
 
Civil aviation cooperation (including possibility to purchase civil aircraft) and removal of 
restrictions on civil aircraft manufacturers from exporting such aircraft to Iran, thereby opening 
up the prospect of Iran purchasing a new fleet of modern civil airliners. 
 
Energy Partnership 
 
Establishment of a long-term strategic energy partnership between Iran and the EU, i.e. extension 
and modernisation of oil and gas sectors, scientific and technological cooperation also on 
downstream activities, development of the Iranian energy infrastructure incl. pipeline 
construction, and in the area of energy efficiency and renewable energies. 
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High Technology Co-operation 
 
Co-operation in the fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed. 
 
Research & Development in Nuclear Energy 
 
- provide a substantive package of research and development co-operation, including 
possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the fields of radioisotope 
production, basic research and nuclear applications in medicine and agriculture. 
 
Fuel Guarantees 
 
- give legally binding, multi-layered fuel assurances to Iran, based notably on: 
• participation as a partner in an international fuel cycle centre in Russia, which 
would enrich all UP6 produced by the UCF at Isfahan; 
• establishment of a facility/fuel bank/buffer stock to hold a reserve of up to 5 
years' supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with participation and under 
supervision of the IAEA; 
• implementation of US/French ideas on multi-layer assurance of supply 
mechanism. 
 
Review of Moratorium 
 
The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build international 
confidence, include a clause for review of the agreement in all its aspects, to follow: 
 
- confirmation by the IAEA that all outstanding issues and other international concerns 
have been resolved and that it is in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared 
nuclear activities or materials in Iran or diversion of nuclear materials; 
- demonstration by Iran that any new activity in the nuclear field is linked to a credible and 
coherent economic rationale in support of the existing civilian power generation 
programme; 
- and decisions by the IAEA, BoG and UNSC that all of Iran's obligations have been met 
and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's civil nuclear 
programme has been restored. 
 
POLITICAL 
 
Regional Security Co-operation 
 
Support for an Inter-governmental regional forum, including Countries of the region and other 
interested Countries, to promote dialogue and cooperation on security issues in the Persian Gulf, 
i.e. with the aim of establishing regional security arrangements and a co-operative relationship 
on important regional security issues, including guarantees for territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty. 
 
WMD Free Zone in the Middle East 
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Support the objective of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means 
of delivery in Middle East. 
 
POSSIBLE MEASURES IN THE EVENT THAT IRAN DOES NOT COOPERATE 
 
In the event that Iran does not co-operate with the international community, we would adopt 
proportionate measures, selected from the following list, in order to give effect to the decisions 
of the international community.  Where appropriate, these measures would be adopted under 
Chapter VII Article 41 of the UN Charter. 
 
Measures Targeted Against Iran's Nuclear and Missiles Programmes 
 
a) Embargo on export of goods and technologies relevant to these programmes. 
 
b) Freeze of assets and ban on financial transactions of organisations and/or individuals 
involved in these programmes. 
 
c) Travel/visa ban on individuals related to these programmes. 
 
d) Suspension of technical co-operation with the IAEA. 
 
e) Ban on investment against entities associated with these industries. 
 
f) Ban on Iranians from studying abroad disciplines related to nuclear and missile 
development. 
 
Political and Economic Measures 
 
g) Reduction/freeze of bilateral contacts. 
 
h) Visa/travel ban on selected high-ranking officials and personalities. 
 
i) Freeze of assets of individuals and organisations connected to or close to the regime. 
 
j) Arms embargo against Iran. 
 
k) Embargo on exports of specific products (e.g. refined oil/gas products) to Iran. 
 
l) End support for Iran's WTO Membership Application. 
 
m) Prohibition on co-operation/investment in Iran in certain sectors. 
 
n) General freeze of assets of Iranian financial institutions. 
 
o) Reduction in government support for trade and export credit insurance to Iran. 
 
